PART III — COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S DE ANIMA¶
On Sensible and Intelligible Matter and the Necessity of Turning to the Phantasms
Source Work: Sentencia libri De anima (c. 1267–1268) · Switch to Diplomatic Latin · Summary · GEOMETOR Notes
Book I, Lecture 11 — On Democritus’s Account of Motion and How Geometers Imagine a Moving Point Describing a Line¶
Latin Locus: Lib. I, lect. 11 · Commentary: Notes on Lib. I, lect. 11
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 1 · Marietti #168] After the Philosopher refuted the opinion of those who said without qualification that the soul is moved, here he consequently argues against the opinion of Xenocrates, who added something further beyond motion, namely, that the soul is a self-moving number. And this opinion is much more unreasonable than the opinions of the other philosophers that have been mentioned. For many impossibilities attend those who say that the soul is a self-moving number. First, indeed, there are those that arise from being moved, that is, from motion, which also befall all who say that the soul is moved; and there also befall those who speak in this way proper incongruities of their own, namely from the fact that they say that the soul is a number. And on account of this, the Philosopher refutes this definition of the soul given by Xenocrates, and he is arguing not merely against the wording, but against the very intention of the one defining. Concerning this he does two things. First, he shows that this definition is incongruous with respect to the soul itself or the substance of the soul; second, with respect to its accidents, at Comprehending them together into one, and so forth. Concerning the first he does two things. For first he demolishes the aforesaid definition of the soul by arguments; second, he shows that upon this definition follow all the incongruities that follow upon the opinions of the other philosophers, at Moreover, there befalls, as we have said, and so forth.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 2 · Marietti #169] Now that the aforesaid definition is incongruous he proves by six arguments, the first of which is as follows. You say that the soul is a self-moving number; now a number consists of units; therefore you say that the soul is units. If you say that the soul is a self-moving number, then you also say that the soul is self-moving units. Yet every self-mover has two parts, as he proves in the eighth book of the Physics, one of which is moving and the other moved; therefore one will have to say that a unit or a point will be divided into two parts, one of which is moving and the other moved. Now this is impossible; therefore it is impossible that the soul be a self-moving number. And that it is impossible for a unit to have one moving part and another moved part, he proves: because in no way can that which is altogether indivisible and undifferentiated be understood to be moved per se in such a way as to have one moving part and another moved part. For in nothing can these two—namely, the motive or moving power and the mobile or moved—exist unless they differ. Since, therefore, a unit is indivisible and undifferentiated, it cannot have parts of this sort, and thus neither can it be moved. Therefore the soul is not a self-moving number.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 3 · Marietti #170] He sets down the second argument when he says Furthermore, since, which is as follows. You say that the soul is a number; therefore it is also units, as has been said. Now between a unit and a point there is no difference except that a point has position, for a point is a unit having position. Yet if the soul is a number, such a number of the soul must be somewhere and have position; therefore the soul will be a unit having position. Now things of this sort are points; therefore the soul will be points. Yet according to what the Platonists say, the motion of a point makes a line, while a moved line makes a surface, and a surface a body. Now the soul is a self-moving number, and therefore in the same way a self-moving unit, and consequently it is a self-moving point; yet a moved point makes nothing other than a line; therefore the motion of the soul makes nothing other than a line. And thus the soul by its motion does not cause life, but a line, which is false. Therefore the soul is not a self-moving number.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 4 · Marietti #171] He sets down the third argument when he says Furthermore, moreover, which is as follows. If the soul is a number, as you say, it must follow the attributes and nature of number; yet it is established that if someone subtracts any unit from a number, or adds one to it, it changes its species. For if to this number, namely three, you add a unit, it changes its species; for one species belongs to this number four, and another to that which is three. And if you subtract a unit from the same, it becomes two and likewise changes its species. Now it is established that animals take their species from the soul, since each thing attains its species through its form. Therefore, if the soul is a number, upon the subtraction from or addition of something to the soul, there remains a soul of another species; and this is false. For we see in the cuttings of plants and of segmented animals that when divided or cut off they live and retain the same species. Therefore the soul is not a self-moving number.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 5 · Marietti #172] He sets down the fourth argument when he says Yet it will seem, which is as follows. You say that the soul is a number; and as has been said, it follows that the soul is units having position, and consequently that it is points. Now according to this, if we consider rightly, it will surely seem to make no difference whether one says that the soul is small and indivisible bodies, as \ Democritus said, or says that it is units having position. For a one having position is a quantity and indivisible. From this, therefore, I argue thus: the soul, according to your position, is a self-moving number, and consequently self-moving units and points. Now let us suppose that the indivisible bodies posited by Democritus are points—because it makes no difference, as has been said—and let them be quantified, which is necessary because strictly nothing is moved unless it is quantified. Yet points of this sort move themselves, because the soul is a self-moving number. Now in a self-mover, as has been said, there are two elements; therefore there will be within the point itself one element that is moving and another that is moved. Nor does it matter whether they are large or small, provided they have quantity; because in every \ continuum that moves itself this occurs, namely, that there are two elements there, one as moving and the other as moved. And thus there must be something that moves the units. Now in an animal, that which moves the animal is the soul; therefore in a number too, that which moves the number will be the soul; therefore the soul is not that which is moved, but that which moves. And thus the definition of the soul as a self-moving number is bad; rather, it should be a number moving a moved number.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 6 · Marietti #173] He sets down the fifth argument when he says Moreover, it happens, which is as follows. According to the opinion of Xenocrates it happens that this—namely, the soul—is a unit; yet from this it happens that it is points, because if the soul is a unit, it must differ from other units. Yet it will not be able to differ from them except by position. For what is the difference of a solitary point—that is, of an understood unit—except position? Now no unit except one having position is a point; therefore the soul is not a unit, but points. Yet the soul is in a body, and every body has its own points per se. I ask, therefore, whether the points that are the soul are the same as the points of the body, or other. If indeed they are other, then in every part of the body there will be points of the soul, and thus there will be two points of the soul in the same place at once. And if two, why not more, or even infinitely many? For things whose place is indivisible are themselves indivisible as well, whence they do not need a larger place. Hence, if two are posited to be in an indivisible place, consequently infinitely many can be in the same place. If, on the other hand, you say that the points that are in the body are the same as these points that are the soul, it follows that, since every body has points, every body has a soul; yet this is false. Therefore the soul is not a self-moving number.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 7 · Marietti #174] He sets down the sixth argument when he says Furthermore, moreover, and it is taken from the preceding one. It is as follows: as has been said, it follows from the position of Xenocrates that the soul is points; yet we see that points are neither separated nor detached from bodies, for lines are not divided from surfaces, nor points from lines. The soul, however, is separated and detached from the body; therefore it is neither points nor a number. It is clear, therefore, that Xenocrates’s definition of the soul is incongruous with respect to the elements placed in the definition.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 8 · Marietti #175] Consequently, when he says Moreover, there befalls, he says that the aforesaid definition is incongruous with respect to the incongruities that follow from it. For from such a definition of the soul follow all the incongruities that follow from the opinions of all the philosophers concerning the soul. For certain thinkers erred concerning the soul and said that it is a body composed of the most subtle parts. From this it followed that, since the soul is wherever sensation is in the body, and sensation is everywhere throughout the body, if the soul is a body, two bodies would be in the same place at once. And this very same thing will follow if the soul is points, as has been said—namely, that two are in the same place at once, and even infinitely many—and this if the points of the soul are other than the points of the body. Yet if there is not made a different number of points of the soul—that is, if the points of the soul do not differ from the points that are in the body—it follows that in every body there is a soul; for in every body points are to be found.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 9 · Marietti #176] Others, however, such as Democritus, erred in saying that the soul is moved, and that the body is moved by the motion of the soul; and since he said that the soul is composed of indivisible spheres and that the body is moved by their motion, it followed that the body would be moved by indivisible bodies. And this very same incongruity follows from the definition of these thinkers—namely, that the animal is moved by a number, and consequently by points; and it makes no difference whether one speaks of small spheres, or of large units, or of any units whatever being moved. For in both cases—that is, in spherical bodies and in units—it is necessary that the soul be moved, inasmuch as they themselves, namely the spherical bodies and the points or units, are moved.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 10 · Marietti #177] Consequently, when he says Comprehending them, therefore, he shows the insufficiency of the aforesaid definition on the side of accidents. He says, accordingly, that whenever a definition is adequately assigned, it ought to lead to the knowledge not only of the substance of the thing defined, but also of its accidents. Yet if we weave together into one these two elements that have been placed in the definition of the soul—namely, number and motion—not only do there befall us the incongruities that have been stated concerning the very substance of the soul, but also many others; because it is impossible not only that these two be the definition, that is, the substance of the soul, but it is also impossible that they themselves—namely, number and motion—be accidents of the soul, or lead to the knowledge of its accidents. It is not, therefore, a congruous definition, since it does not lead to the knowledge of the accidents. And that it does not lead to the knowledge of the accidents of the soul is manifest if anyone attempts from a definition of this sort to account for the passions and operations of the soul, such as reasonings, pleasure, sorrow, and the like. For from them—namely, from number and motion—not only will it not be easy to arrive at a knowledge of the accidents and operations of the soul, but we shall not even be able to conjecture anything from them concerning those very passions and operations of the soul.
Book II, Lecture 16 — On Sound in Act and Potency and Its Fluent Mode of Being in Motion¶
Latin Locus: Lib. II, lect. 16 · Commentary: Notes on Lib. II, lect. 16
[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 1 · Marietti #438] After the Philosopher determined concerning the visible, here he determines concerning the audible, that is, concerning sound. And this is divided into two parts. In the first, he determines concerning sound in general; in the second, he determines concerning a certain species of sound, namely voice, at Voice, however. The first is divided into two parts: in the first, he determines concerning sound; in the second, concerning the differences of sounds, at Now the differences of sounds. The first is divided into two: in the first, he determines concerning sound; in the second, he raises a certain doubt regarding what has been previously determined, at Whether, however, there sounds. The first is divided into two: in the first, he determines concerning the generation of sound; in the second, concerning the alteration of hearing by sound, at Now the void. Now if it be asked why he determines here concerning the generation of sound, whereas above he did not determine concerning the generation of color, but only concerning the alteration of the sense and the medium by color, it must be said that color, odor, flavor, and tangible qualities have a permanent and fixed being in their subject. Hence there is one consideration of those qualities in themselves, and another insofar as they alter the sense; and on account of this each belongs to a distinct inquiry. Accordingly, the Philosopher determines concerning the generation of color, flavor, and odor in the book On Sense and the Sensible, and concerning tangible qualities in the book On Generation and Corruption, and as regards certain aspects in the Meteorology. In this book, however, he does not intend to determine concerning sensibles except insofar as they are alterative of the sense. Sound, by contrast, is caused by motion, and does not have a fixed and resting being in a subject, but consists in a certain alteration; whence it is determined simultaneously both insofar as it is generated in its own species and insofar as it alters the sense. Now the first part is divided into two: in the first, he determines concerning the primary generation of sound; in the second, concerning the secondary generation of sound that takes place by reflection, at Echo, however, occurs. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that sound is sometimes in act and sometimes in potency; second, he shows how sound comes to be in act, at Now it comes to be according to act.
[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 2 · Marietti #439] He says, therefore, first, that before determining concerning touch and taste, we must speak of sound and smell—and first of sound, because it is more immaterial, as was shown above. Now sound is spoken of in two ways: for sound is spoken of in act, and sound in potency. For we say that something has sound both when it actually sounds and when it has the potency of sounding—as when we say, ‘This bell sounds well,’ even though it is not sounding in act. And according to this manner we say that certain things have no sound because they do not have the potency of sounding, such as a sponge and soft things of this sort; whereas certain things are said to have sound because they are able to sound, such as bronze and other flat and smooth things of this sort. Thus, therefore, it is clear that sound is sometimes spoken of according to potency, and sometimes according to act.
[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 3 · Marietti #440] Yet that sound comes to be in act pertains both to the medium and to hearing. For every sensible is said to be in act in two ways. In one way, when it is actually sensed, that is, while its species is in the sense; and thus sound is in act insofar as it is in hearing. In another way, insofar as it possesses its proper species through which it can be sensed, as existing in its subject; and thus other sensibles come to be in act as they exist in sensible bodies, such as color as existing in a colored body, and odor and flavor as existing in an odoriferous and flavorful body. Yet it is not so with sound. For in the sounding body sound exists only in potency, whereas in the medium that is moved by the striking of the sounding body, sound comes to be in act. And on account of this it is said that sound in act belongs to the medium and to hearing, and not to the resonant subject.
[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 4 · Marietti #441] Next, when he says Now it comes to be, he shows how sound comes to be in act. And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows how many factors concur in order that sound be constituted in act; second, he shows of what sort they must be, at Now just as we have said. He says, therefore, first, that for sound to come to be in act, three factors must concur. For it always comes to be of something, and against something, and in something; and therefore if there is one thing alone, it cannot produce sound. And the reason or sign of this is that percussion is the cause of sound; there must therefore be something—that is, that which strikes—and something struck. And on account of this he says that sound is of something against something, that is, of that which strikes against that which is struck. For what produces sound must touch something, and when it has touched it by its blow, sound is then generated. Now the blow of that which strikes does not occur without local motion, and local motion is not without a medium. Hence it remains that there must also be a medium in order that sound come to be in act. And this is what was said, namely, that sound must be not only of something and against something, but also in something.
[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 5 · Marietti #442] Next, when he says Now just as, he shows of what sort the things required for the generation of sound must be. First, he shows of what sort that which strikes and that which is struck must be; second, of what sort the medium must be, at Furthermore, moreover. He says, therefore, first, that just as has been said above, sound does not arise from the striking of just any bodies whatever. For it was stated above that hairs, sponges, and soft things of this sort do not have the potency of sounding, whence they produce no sound even if they are struck. The reason for this is that soft things yield to that which strikes them; hence air is not forcefully expelled by the percussion so that sound could be formed in it from the blow of the striker and the resistance of what is struck. Yet if soft things of this sort are compressed so that they acquire some hardness and resist the striker, a sound ensues, albeit a dull sound. Bronze, however, and smooth and hollow bodies produce sound by their percussion. For it is necessary that the bodies from whose percussion sound is given forth be hard, so that the air may be expelled—which expulsion is indeed the cause of the generation of sound. It is also required that they be smooth, so that the air may remain one, as will be stated below.
[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 6 · Marietti #443] Hollow bodies too, when struck, give forth sound well, because air is enclosed within them. And when the air first set in motion cannot immediately escape, it strikes other air, and thus from the repercussion many blows occur and the sound is multiplied. And on account of this as well, bodies that have well-disposed air in their composition are highly resonant, such as bronze and silver; whereas those in whose composition air is not well disposed are not very resonant, such as lead and other things of this sort, which are more drossy and earthy.
[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 7 · Marietti #444] Next, when he says Furthermore, it is heard, he shows of what sort the medium is in which sound is generated; and he says that the medium in which sound is heard is air and water, though it is heard less in water than in air; whence the most proper medium, both in the generation of sound and in hearing, is air. And because the medium in every sense lacks the sensible qualities pertaining to that sense so that it may be able to receive them all, it is manifest that neither air nor water has a proper sound of its own; rather, it is necessary for the generation of sound in air or water that certain firm or solid and hard bodies strike one another and strike the air.
[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 8 · Marietti #445] Now that the striking of solid bodies against one another—and consequently sound and the striking against the air—occurs simultaneously happens when the air remains in its integrity so that it can be struck, and is not divided prior to the percussion. And on account of this we see that if something touches another with a slow motion, it makes no sound, because the air withdraws and disperses before the contact of the solid bodies takes place. Yet if the percussion is swift and forceful, then sound occurs; because for sound to occur, the motion of the striker must forestall the division of the air, so that the air while still united or gathered together can be struck, and sound be generated in it. And it is similar to when something borne swiftly can strike a heap of stones before it scatters, which does not happen if it is moved slowly. And on account of this too, when something is borne swiftly through the air itself, it produces sound by its motion, because the air itself, while still united, stands in the role of that which is struck and not solely that of the medium.
[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 9 · Marietti #446] Next, when he says Echo, however, he determines concerning the secondary generation of sound, which takes place by reverberation—which sound is called an echo. First, therefore, he determines how it is generated; second, he shows how it is diversified in its generation, at Now it seems. Concerning the first, it must be noted that the generation of sound in air follows upon the motion of the air, as has been said. Now it happens with the alteration of air in the generation of sound just as with the alteration of water when something is cast into water. For it is manifest that certain circular ripples arise around the water that has been struck. Near the place of percussion these ripples are small and the motion is strong, whereas at a distance the circles are large and the motion weaker, and finally the motion vanishes altogether and the ripples cease. Yet if before the motion ceases those circular ripples encounter some obstacle, a circular motion arises in the contrary direction, and all the more vehemently the closer they are to the initial percussion.
[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 10 · Marietti #447] Thus, therefore, it must be understood that upon the percussion of sounding bodies the air is moved in circles and sound is diffused in every direction. Near at hand the circular waves are smaller, yet the motion is stronger, whence the sound is perceived more strongly; whereas at a distance the circular waves are larger, the motion weaker, and the sound is heard more faintly; and at last the whole dies away. Yet if before circular waves of this sort die away there occurs a reverberation of the air thus moved and carrying the sound against some body, the circular waves will turn back in the contrary direction, and thus the sound is heard as though from the opposite side. And this is called an echo.
[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 11 · Marietti #448] This occurs chiefly when the obstacle against which the moved air rebounds is some hollow body, like a vessel bounding and enclosing the air in its unity and thereby preventing it from dispersing. For then that air, thus united and set in commotion, because it cannot extend its motion any further on account of the obstructing body, strikes back against the air by which it was struck, and a motion arises in the contrary direction—just as happens when someone throws a ball, which is here called a sphere, and upon encountering an obstacle it rebounds.
[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 12 · Marietti #449] Next, when he says Now it seems, he shows how an echo occurs in diverse ways; and he says that an echo seems always to occur, though it does not always occur as distinct, that is, manifestly perceptible. And he shows this by a likeness. For he says that it happens with sound just as with light. For light is always reflected, yet sometimes the reflection of light is manifest and sometimes not. The reflection of light is indeed manifest when it is reflected from some shining body, so that the reflection of light takes place with a certain brightness, in a manner similar to the primary emission of light. On the other hand, the reflection of light is unmanifest when it is reflected from some opaque body, because a reflection of this sort occurs without brightness and emission of rays. For unless a reflection of the sun’s rays took place from opaque bodies, light would not occur everywhere—that is, in every part of the air of the upper hemisphere—but everywhere outside the sun, that is, outside the places reached directly by the solar rays, there would be darkness. Nevertheless, light is not reflected from opaque bodies in the same way as from water or bronze or any among smooth and polished bodies, from which reflection occurs with brightness and emission of rays. And therefore, because the reflection that takes place from opaque bodies is not similar to the reflection that takes place from shining bodies, the reflection that takes place from opaque bodies produces darkness—that is, shadow—on that side where the manifest light resulting from the direct emission of solar rays is bounded. In a similar way, when the reflection of sound takes place against a hollow body in which sound is naturally suited to be multiplied, a distinct echo occurs, that is, one manifestly comprehensible; whereas when the reverberation of sound takes place against other bodies that are not naturally suited to multiply sound, no manifest echo occurs.
Book III, Lecture 8 — On the Object of the Intellect: Flesh and Bone vs. the Continuum, the Snub vs. the Straight, and Reflection upon the Phantasm¶
Latin Locus: Lib. III, lect. 8 · Commentary: Notes on Lib. III, lect. 8
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 1 · Marietti #699] After the Philosopher determined concerning the possible intellect, which is in potency to intelligible things, here he shows how it is reduced to act. First, he shows that the intellect sometimes comes to be in act; second, he shows what its proper object is with respect to which it comes to be in act, at Now since magnitude is one thing. He shows, accordingly, how the intellect is reduced to act, saying: it has been stated that the intellective soul is not actually the species themselves, but only in potency; when, however, it thus becomes each of them—that is, is so reduced to the act of intelligible species in the manner in which a knower, namely one possessing the habit of science, possesses species in act—then too it is called the intellect that is according to act. Now this happens as soon as someone is able through himself to operate with the operation of the intellect, which is understanding itself—just as someone possesses any form in act when he is able to exercise the operation of that form.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 2 · Marietti #700] Yet although the intellect is then in a way in act when it possesses intelligible species, just as a knower possesses a habit, it is nevertheless even then in a way in potency—not, however, in the same way in which it was previously in potency before acquiring science through learning or discovery. For before it possessed the habit of science, which is first act, it could not operate whenever it wished, but had to be reduced to act by another; whereas once it already possesses the habit of science, which is first act, it is able, whenever it wishes, to proceed into second act, which is operation.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 3 · Marietti #701] Now from what is said here it is manifest that the opinion held by \ Avicenna concerning intelligible species, contrary to the opinion of \ Aristotle, is false. For Avicenna posits that species are not preserved in the possible intellect, nor exist in it except when it actually understands; rather, according to him, whenever it actually understands, it must turn toward a separate agent intelligence, from which intelligible species flow forth into the possible intellect.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 4 · Marietti #702] Contrary to this, the Philosopher here manifestly says that the intellect is reduced to the act of species in the manner in which one who knows in act is still potentially understanding. For when the intellect actually understands, the intelligible species exist in it according to perfect act; whereas when it possesses the habit of science, the species exist in the intellect itself in an intermediate manner between pure potency and pure act.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 5 · Marietti #703] And because he had said that when the intellect comes to be in a way in act with respect to each of the things to which it was in potency, it is then able to understand, whereas with respect to itself it was in no way in potency, someone might suppose that once made in act it would not understand itself; and therefore, to exclude this, he adds that the intellect, once made in act, can understand not only other things, but then too is able to understand itself.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 6 · Marietti #704] Next, when he says Now since, the Philosopher shows what the object of the intellect is. To make this clear, it must be known that in the seventh book of the Metaphysics the Philosopher inquires whether the ‘what it is’—that is, the \ quiddity or essence of a thing, which the definition signifies—is the same as the thing. And because \ Plato posited that the quiddities of things are separated from singulars, calling them Ideas or Species, he accordingly shows there that the quiddities of things are not other than the things except per accidens: for instance, the quiddity of a white man and a white man are not the same, because the quiddity of man contains within itself nothing save what pertains to the species of man, whereas what I call ‘a white man’ has something within itself beyond what belongs to the human species.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 7 · Marietti #705] Now this happens in all things having form in matter, because in them there is something beyond the principles of the species. For the nature of the species is individuated through matter; hence the individuating principles and the accidents of the individual are outside the essence of the species. And therefore it happens that several individuals are found under one species, which, although they do not differ in the nature of the species, nevertheless differ according to individuating principles. And on account of this, in all things having form in matter, the thing and its ‘what it is’ are not altogether the same: for Socrates is not his humanity. In those things, on the other hand, that do not have form in matter, such as simple forms, nothing can exist beyond the essence of the species, because the form itself is the whole essence. And therefore in such things there cannot be several individuals of one species, nor can the thing and its ‘what it is’ differ in them.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 8 · Marietti #706] It must also be considered that not only natural things have their species in matter, but mathematical things as well. For matter is twofold: namely, \ sensible matter, from which mathematical things abstract while natural things involve it, and \ intelligible matter, which mathematical things involve. And this is to be understood as follows. For it is manifest that quantity inheres immediately in substance, whereas sensible qualities are founded upon quantity, such as white and black, hot and cold. Now when what is posterior is removed, what is prior remains; hence, when sensible qualities are removed according to the intellect, continuous quantity still remains in the intellect.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 9 · Marietti #707] Certain forms, therefore, require matter under a determinate disposition of sensible qualities, and of this sort are all natural forms; and therefore natural things involve sensible matter. Certain other forms, however, do not demand matter under a determinate disposition of sensible qualities, yet require matter existing under quantity, such as a triangle, a square, and the like; and these are called mathematical things, and they abstract from sensible matter, though not from intelligible matter, inasmuch as continuous quantity remains in the intellect when abstracted from sensible quality. Thus, therefore, it is clear that just as natural things have form in matter, so too do mathematical things; and on account of this, in both natural things and mathematical things the thing and its ‘what it is’ differ, whence in both there are found several individuals under one species. For just as there are several men of one species, so too there are several triangles under one species.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 10 · Marietti #708] With these points established, therefore, it is plain to gather the meaning from the text of the Philosopher. For he says that magnitude and the being of magnitude are distinct—that is, magnitude and its ‘what it is’ are distinct, for he calls its quiddity ‘the being that belongs to magnitude.’ And likewise water and the being of water are distinct, and so it is in many other things, that is, in all mathematical and natural things. Hence he pointedly set down two examples: for magnitude is something mathematical, whereas water is something natural.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 11 · Marietti #709] Yet not in all things does this occur. For in those things that are altogether separated from matter, the thing and its ‘what it is’ are the same. And because separate substances are unknown to us, he could not name them by proper names as he did mathematical and natural things, but named them under the example of natural things. And this is what he adds, namely, that in certain things ‘to be for flesh’ and ‘flesh’ are the same—by which he does not mean that flesh and its ‘what it is’ are the same. For then he would not say that it is so in certain things, but would say without qualification that flesh and ‘to be for flesh’ are the same. Rather, he means that what are thus spoken of as ‘something’ and ‘to be for something’—such as ‘flesh’ and ‘to be for flesh’—are the same in certain things, that is, in those things that are separated from matter.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 12 · Marietti #710] And because diverse cognitive powers are required for knowing diverse things, he concludes that the soul knows the thing by one power and its quiddity by another, or else by one and the same power, though differently disposed. Now it is manifest that flesh does not exist without matter; rather, the form of flesh is a determinate form in determinate sensible matter, just as the snub also has a determinate sensible subject, namely the nose. This sensible nature, accordingly, the soul knows through sense. And this is what he adds, namely, that by the sensitive power the soul judges the hot and the cold, and other things of this sort, of which flesh is a certain ratio, that is, proportion; for the form of flesh requires a determinate proportion of hot and cold and other things of this sort.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 13 · Marietti #711] Yet another power must discern the being for flesh, that is, the ‘what it is’ of flesh. Now this happens in two ways. In one way, such that flesh itself and the quiddity of flesh are known by powers altogether distinct from one another—for instance, the quiddity of flesh is known by the intellective power, while flesh is known by the sensitive power; and this occurs when the soul knows the singular per se and knows the nature of the species per se. In another way, it happens that both flesh and the ‘what it is’ of flesh are known, not because there is one power and another power, but because one and the same power, in one manner and in another manner, knows flesh and its ‘what it is’; and this must be the case when the soul compares the universal to the singular. For just as was stated above, because we could not sense the difference between sweet and white unless there were one common sensitive power that knew both, so too we could not know the comparison of the universal to the particular unless there were one power that knew both. The intellect, therefore, knows both, though in different ways.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 14 · Marietti #712] For it knows the nature of the species, or the ‘what it is,’ directly by extending itself forth, whereas it knows the singular itself through a certain reflection, inasmuch as it returns upon the \ phantasms from which the intelligible species are abstracted. And this is what he says: whereas by the sensitive power it knows flesh, by another—that is, by another power—it discerns the being for flesh, that is, the ‘what it is’ of flesh, either by a separate power (for instance, when flesh is known by sense and the being of flesh by the intellect), or by the same power differently disposed: namely, just as a bent line stands to itself, the intellective soul knows flesh; and when it is extended straight, it discerns the being for flesh—that is, it directly apprehends the quiddity of flesh, and by reflection, flesh itself.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 15 · Marietti #713] Next, when he says Again, moreover, what he had stated above regarding natural things he expounds regarding mathematical things, saying that again among things that exist by abstraction—that is, among mathematical things, whose definition abstracts from sensible matter—the straight stands just as the snub does. For these mathematical things have matter, just as natural things also do. For the straight is something mathematical, whereas the snub is something natural; for the definition of the straight is with the \ continuum, just as the definition of the snub is with the nose. Now the continuum is intelligible matter, just as the snub involves sensible matter. Hence it is manifest that in mathematical things too, the thing and the ‘what it was to be’ are distinct—such as the straight and ‘to be for the straight’—whence the soul must know the ‘what it was to be’ of these things in one way, and the things themselves in another.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 16 · Marietti #714] And let us suppose for the present, by way of example with Plato, that duality is the ‘what it was to be’ of a straight line; for Plato posited that numbers were the species and quiddities of mathematical things—for instance, unity of a line, duality of a straight line, and so with the rest. It is necessary, therefore, that the soul know the mathematical things themselves and their quiddities either by another power, or by the same power differently disposed. Hence, just as through natural things it is shown that the intellect, which knows the quiddities of natural things, is other than sense, which knows singular natural things themselves, so too from mathematical things it is shown that the intellect, which knows their ‘what it is,’ is other than the imaginative power, which apprehends the mathematical things themselves.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 17 · Marietti #715] And because someone might say that mathematical things and natural things are understood in the same way, he adds that just as things are separable from matter, so too do they stand in relation to the intellect. Hence those things that are separated from sensible matter according to being can be perceived by the intellect alone; whereas those things that are separated from sensible matter not according to being, but according to definition, are understood without sensible matter, though not without intelligible matter. Natural things, on the other hand, are understood by abstraction from individual matter, yet not by abstraction from sensible matter altogether: for man is understood as composed of flesh and bones, yet by abstraction from this flesh and these bones. And hence it is that the intellect does not directly know singulars, whereas sense or imagination does.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 18 · Marietti #716] Now from what the Philosopher says here it is apparent that the proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of a thing, which is not separated from things as the Platonists posited. Hence that which is the object of our intellect is not something existing outside sensible things, as the Platonists posited, but something existing in sensible things, even though the intellect apprehends the quiddities of things in a manner different from that in which they exist in sensible things. For it does not apprehend them together with the individuating conditions that are joined to them in sensible things. And this can happen without falsehood on the part of the intellect. For nothing prevents one of two things conjoined to each other from being understood without the other being understood—just as sight apprehends color without apprehending odor, though not without apprehending magnitude, which is the proper subject of color. Accordingly, the intellect too can understand some form without its individuating principles, though not without the matter upon which the definition of that form depends: thus it cannot understand the snub without the nose, whereas it can understand the curved without the nose. And because the Platonists failed to draw this distinction, they posited that mathematical things and the quiddities of things are separated in being just as they are separated in the intellect.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 19 · Marietti #717] It is also manifest that the intelligible species by which the possible intellect comes to be in act are not the object of the intellect. For they do not stand to the intellect as that which is understood, but as that by which it understands. For just as the species that is in sight is not that which is seen, but that by which sight sees—whereas that which is seen is the color existing in the body—so too that which the intellect understands is the quiddity existing in things, and not the intelligible species, except insofar as the intellect reflects upon itself. For it is manifest that the sciences treat of the things that the intellect understands; now the sciences treat of things, and not of intelligible species or intentions, save rational science alone. Hence it is manifest that the intelligible species is not the object of the intellect, but rather the quiddity of the thing understood.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 20 · Marietti #718] From this it is clear that there is no force in the argument of certain thinkers who wish to show that the possible intellect is one in all men from the fact that the same thing is understood by all, whereas there would have to be numerically several intelligible species if there are several intellects. For the intelligible species is not the very thing understood, but a likeness of it in the soul; and therefore, if there are several intellects possessing the likeness of one and the same thing, it will be the same thing that is understood among them all. And besides this, it is manifest that separate substances also understand the quiddities of natural things that we understand, and yet their intellects are distinct. Hence, if their argument were cogent, the incongruity they infer would not be avoided by positing a single intellect in all men; for they cannot posit a single intellect in all understanding beings.
Book III, Lecture 12 — Why the Soul Never Understands Without a Phantasm and How Mathematical Entities Are Understood in Abstraction¶
Latin Locus: Lib. III, lect. 12 · Commentary: Notes on Lib. III, lect. 12
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 1 · Marietti #764] After the Philosopher determined concerning the intellect in itself, here he determines concerning the intellect in comparison with sense. And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows of what sort the motion of sense is; second, he likens the motion of the intellect to the motion of sense, at Sensing, therefore, indeed. He says, therefore, first, that the sensible appears to make the sensitive part exist in act from having been in potency. For the sensible does not act upon sense in the way a contrary acts upon its contrary, so as to cast something out from it by transmuting and altering it, but solely reduces it from potency into act. And this is what he adds, namely, that the sensitive power neither undergoes passion nor is altered by the sensible by passion and alteration strictly taken—that is, insofar as this proceeds from contrary into contrary.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 2 · Marietti #765] And because the motion that exists in corporeal things, concerning which he determined in the Physics, is from contrary into contrary, it is manifest that sensing, if it be called a motion, is another species of motion from that concerning which he determined in the Physics. For that motion is the act of a being existing in potency, inasmuch as while receding from one contrary, so long as it is being moved, it does not yet attain the other contrary, which is the term of the motion, but remains in potency; and because everything that is in potency, insofar as it is such, is imperfect, therefore that motion is the act of the imperfect. This motion, however, is the act of the perfect: for it is the operation of sense already made in act through its species. For sensing does not belong to sense except as existing in act; and therefore this motion is altogether other than physical motion. And motion of this sort is strictly called operation, such as sensing, understanding, and willing. And according to this motion the soul moves itself according to \ Plato, inasmuch as it knows and loves itself.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 3 · Marietti #766] Next, when he says Sensing, therefore, he likens the motion of the intellect to the motion of sense. And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows how motion proceeds in sense; second, he shows that it proceeds similarly in the intellect, at Now to the intellective. He says, therefore, first, that since the sensible reduces the sensitive power into act without passion and alteration, just as was stated above regarding the intellect, it is manifest from what has been said that sensing itself is similar to understanding—in such a way, however, that when there is sensing alone, that is, apprehending and judging according to sense, this is similar to what is speaking and understanding alone, namely when the intellect judges and apprehends something; which is to say that the simple apprehension and judgment of sense is likened to the speculation of the intellect. Yet when sense senses something pleasant or painful—as though affirming and denying that what is perceived by sense is pleasant or painful—then it pursues or shuns through appetite, that is, it desires or flees. And he says pointedly as though affirming or denying, because making affirmation and negation is proper to the intellect, as was stated above; yet sense performs something similar to this when it apprehends something as pleasant or painful.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 4 · Marietti #767] And in order that it may be known what experiencing pleasure and experiencing pain are, he adds that experiencing pleasure and experiencing pain is acting with the sensitive mean—that is, a certain action of the sensitive power, which is called a mean inasmuch as the common sense is compared to the proper senses as a certain middle, just as the center is compared to the lines terminating at it. Yet not every action of the sensitive part is experiencing pleasure and pain, but that which is with respect to good or evil insofar as they are such. For the good of sense—namely, what is suitable to it—causes pleasure, whereas the evil—what is repugnant and harmful—causes pain. And from experiencing pain or pleasure follow flight and appetite, that is, desire, which are according to act.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 5 · Marietti #768] It is clear, therefore, that the motion of the sensible upon sense proceeds as though by a threefold step: for first it apprehends the sensible itself as suitable or harmful; second, from this follow pleasure and pain; and third, there follow desire or flight. And although desiring, fleeing, and sensing are distinct acts, nevertheless their principle is the same in subject, though differing in account. And this is what he adds, namely, that the appetitive and the avoidant—that is, the part of the soul that flees and desires—are not distinct in subject either from each other or from the sensitive part, yet their being is distinct, that is, they differ in account. And he says this against Plato, who placed the organ of the appetitive power in one part of the body and the organ of the sensitive power in another.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 6 · Marietti #769] Next, when he says Now to the intellective, he likens the process of motion in the intellect to what has been stated regarding sense. And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows how it stands regarding sensible things; second, how it stands toward those things that are separated from sensible things, at Now by abstraction. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows how the intellect stands regarding sensible things in action; second, he compares the active intellect with the speculative, at And altogether in action. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he likens the process of the intellect to the process of sense; second, he manifests the likeness, at For just as the air. He says, therefore, first, that \ phantasms stand to the intellective part of the soul just as sensibles stand to sense. Hence, just as sense is moved by sensibles, so the intellect is moved by phantasms. And just as when sense apprehends something as pleasant or painful it pursues or flees it, so too when the intellect apprehends something, affirming or denying that it is good or evil, it flees or pursues.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 7 · Marietti #770] Now from \ Aristotle‘s very manner of speaking a twofold difference between the intellect and sense is to be noted. First, in sense there were three steps: for from the apprehension of good or evil there did not immediately follow desire or flight, as happens here regarding the intellect; rather, pleasure and pain followed, and from this further desire and flight. The reason for this is that just as sense does not apprehend universal good, so the appetite of the sensitive part is moved not by universal good or evil, but by a certain determinate good that is pleasant according to sense, and a certain determinate evil that is painful according to sense. In the intellective part, however, there is the apprehension of universal good and evil; hence too the appetite of the intellective part is moved immediately upon the apprehension of good or evil.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 8 · Marietti #771] The second difference is that of the intellect he says without qualification that it affirms or denies, whereas of sense he says that it ‘as it were’ affirms or denies, the reason for which is clear from what has been said. Moreover, from what he had stated he concludes further that if phantasms stand to the intellective soul as the sensible stands to sense, then just as sense cannot sense without a sensible, so the soul cannot understand without a phantasm.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 9 · Marietti #772] Next, when he says For just as, he manifests the likeness set down: first, as regards his statement that phantasms are like sensibles to the intellective soul; second, as regards his statement that when it affirms or denies good or evil, it flees or pursues, at The species, therefore, indeed. He says, therefore, first, that the air altered by color makes the pupil to be of such a sort—that is, qualifies it by impressing upon it the species of color—and the pupil itself, thus altered, alters something further, namely the common sense; and likewise hearing, altered by the air, alters the common sense. And although the external senses are several, nevertheless the ultimate term at which the alterations of these senses terminate is one, because it is like a single mean among all the senses, just as a center at which all lines terminate as at one middle.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 10 · Marietti #773] And although that middle of all the senses is one in subject, nevertheless its being is plural—that is, its account is diversified insofar as it is compared to diverse senses. And this is that by which the soul discerns wherein sweet and hot differ, concerning which we spoke earlier when treating of it in itself; and now too we must speak of it in comparison with the intellect, because it is something one with respect to all sensibles, just as the intellect is the term of all phantasms. And just as on that side there were many things judged by one power, so too these things on the side of the intellect stand in a certain proportional manner—that is, in a way proportionally corresponding to the one power judging regarding sensibles, or else there is a likeness as regards the number of things judged, inasmuch as the intellect stands to both things between which it discerns just as those stood to one another, namely, just as the one common sense stood to the diverse sensibles between which it discerned.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 11 · Marietti #774] And it makes no difference whether, by way of example, we take either non-homogeneous things—that is, diverse sensibles not of a single genus, such as white, which is in the genus of color, and sweet, which is in the genus of flavor, between which the common sense discerns—or whether we take contraries, such as white and black, which belong to a single genus, because the common sense discerns between both.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 12 · Marietti #775] Let us take, therefore, a in place of white, and b in place of black, so that a (white) stands to b (black) just as c stands to d—that is, as the imagination of white stands to the imagination of black. Consequently, by alternation of proportions, a also stands to c just as b stands to d—that is, white to the phantasm of white just as black to the phantasm of black—and thus the intellect stands to c and to d, namely to the phantasm of white and of black, just as sense stands to a and b, that is, to white and black. If, therefore, c and d—that is, the phantasms of white and black—exist within one power, namely are judged by one intellect, they will stand just as a and b, that is, white and black, which are judged by one sense; in such a way that just as the sense judging between these two was one in subject while differing in account, so too will it be with the intellect. And the same reasoning holds if we take non-homogeneous things, namely that a be sweet and b be white.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 13 · Marietti #776] Next, when he says The species, indeed, he manifests what he had stated above—namely, that when the intellect affirms or denies good or evil, it flees or pursues—concluding from what has been said that the intellective part of the soul understands species abstracted from phantasms. And just as something to be pursued or fled is determined for the intellect in those things, namely in sensibles when they are present, so too it is moved toward pursuing or fleeing when they arise in phantasms outside external sense, that is, when phantasms are represented in the absence of sensibles.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 14 · Marietti #777] And he sets down an example of each. First, when one is moved at the presence of sensibles: as when a man sensing something to be fled—that is, something fearful, say some uproar, as when he sees that a fire has been kindled in the city—upon seeing the fire moving, knows by the common—that is, by some common discriminative power, or by the common, that is, from what commonly tends to happen—he knows, I say, that battle is underway, or that an enemy is fighting; and thus the intellect is sometimes moved to flee or to pursue from a present sensible. At other times, however, from the phantasms or intelligibles that are in the soul, one reasons and deliberates about future or present things just as though actually seeing them; and when one judges something to be joyful or sorrowful, one flees it or pursues it, just as in the former case when moved by a present sensible.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 15 · Marietti #778] Next, when he says And altogether, he compares the cognition of the practical and speculative intellect, saying that the true and the false—that is, true and false cognition of the intellect—in action, that is, insofar as it pertains to the practical intellect, and without action, that is, insofar as it pertains to the speculative intellect, is in the same genus, whether that genus be good or evil. This can be understood in two ways. In one way, such that the thing understood either practically or speculatively is sometimes good and sometimes evil, nor is the genus of the thing diversified on account of its being considered speculatively or practically. In another way, it can be understood such that true cognition itself is a certain good of the intellect, whether speculative or practical, and false cognition itself is a certain evil of the intellect, whether speculative or practical.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 16 · Marietti #779] He does not, therefore, intend to compare the true and the false to good and evil according to generic agreement, but rather the true and the false that is in action to the true and the false that is without action. And this is clear from the difference he adds, saying that what is in action and what is without action differ by the unqualified and the particular. For the speculative intellect considers something to be true or false in the universal, which is to consider without qualification; whereas the practical intellect does so by applying it to a particular operable thing, because operation deals with particulars.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 17 · Marietti #780] Next, when he says Now by abstraction, because the Philosopher had stated that the soul never understands without a phantasm, while phantasms are received from sense, he wishes to show how our intellect understands those things that are separated from the senses. And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows how it understands mathematical things, which are abstracted from \ sensible matter; second, he inquires whether it understands those things that are separated from matter according to being, at Now whether it happens. Concerning the first, it must be considered that among things conjoined in reality, one can be understood without the other, and truly so, provided that one of them is not included in the definition of the other. For if Socrates is musical and white, we can understand whiteness while understanding nothing of music; yet I cannot understand man while understanding nothing of animal, because animal is included in the definition of man. Thus, therefore, in separating according to the intellect things that are conjoined in reality in the aforesaid manner, no falsehood occurs.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 18 · Marietti #781] If, however, the intellect should understand things that are conjoined to exist separately, the intellect would be false—for instance, if in the aforesaid example it were to assert that the musical man is not white. Yet the intellect abstracts those things that exist in sensibles not indeed by understanding them to exist separately, but by understanding them separately or apart. And this is what he says, namely, that the intellect understands the things spoken of by abstraction, that is, mathematical things, in the following manner: whereas while understanding the snub insofar as it is the snub, it does not understand the snub separately—that is, apart—from sensible matter, because sensible matter, namely the nose, falls within the definition of the snub.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 19 · Marietti #782] If, however, the intellect actually understands something insofar as it is curved, it understands it without flesh insofar as it is curved—not indeed in such a way as to understand the curved to exist without flesh, but because it understands the curved without understanding flesh; and this is because flesh is not placed in the definition of the curved. And in this way the intellect understands all mathematical things separately, just as though they were separated, even though they are not separated in reality.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 20 · Marietti #783] Yet it does not understand natural things in this way, because sensible matter is placed in the definition of natural things, whereas it is not placed in the definition of mathematical things. Regarding natural things, however, the intellect abstracts the universal from the particular in a similar manner, inasmuch as it understands the nature of the species without the individuating principles, which do not fall within the definition of the species. And altogether the intellect in act is the thing understood, because just as things possess or do not possess matter in their definition, so are they perceived by the intellect. And because Plato failed to consider this mode of abstraction, he was compelled to posit separate mathematical entities and separate Species; whereas in place of this, in order to carry out the aforesaid abstraction, Aristotle posited the \ agent intellect.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 21 · Marietti #784] Next, when he says Now whether, he raises a question concerning those things that are separated from matter according to being, saying that it will have to be considered later whether it happens that our intellect, while not separated from magnitude—that is, from the body—understands anything among separate things, that is, any separate substance. For this question could not be determined here, because it was not yet manifest that there exist any separate substances, nor which or of what sort they may be. Hence this question belongs to the metaphysician; yet it is not found solved by Aristotle, because the completion of that science has not yet come down to us, either because the whole book has not yet been translated, or because perhaps, overtaken by death, he did not complete it.
[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 22 · Marietti #785] Nevertheless, it must be noted that here he calls the intellect ‘not separated from the body’ inasmuch as it is a certain power of the soul, which is the act of the body; whereas above he called it ‘separated from the body’ because it has no bodily organ assigned to its operation.
Book III, Lecture 13 — How the Soul Is in a Way All Things, the Hand the Organ of Organs, and the Intellect the Form of Forms¶
Latin Locus: Lib. III, lect. 13 · Commentary: Notes on Lib. III, lect. 13
[lib. 3 l. 13 n. 1 · Marietti #786] After the Philosopher determined concerning sense and the intellect, now through what has been stated concerning both he shows what ought to be held regarding the nature of the soul. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows that the nature of the soul is in a way as the ancients believed, and in a way otherwise; in the second, he shows the dependence of the intellect upon sense, at Now since neither is any thing. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that the soul is in a way all things, as the ancients said; second, he says that it is all things in a manner different from what they said, at Now it is necessary. He says, therefore, first, that now recapitulating the things that have been stated concerning the soul so as to show what is proposed from them, let us say that the soul is in a way all things. For all things that exist are either sensible or intelligible; now the soul is in a way all sensible and intelligible things, because in the soul there are sense and the intellect or science, while sense is in a way the sensibles themselves, and the intellect the intelligibles, or science the knowables.
[lib. 3 l. 13 n. 2 · Marietti #787] And how this comes about we must inquire. For sense and science are divided into things—that is, they are divided into act and potency in the same manner as things are—in such a way, however, that science and sense that are in potency to sensibles and knowables correspond to knowables and sensibles that are in potency, whereas science and sense that are in act are ordered to sensibles and knowables that are in act, though in distinct ways. For sense in act, and science or the intellect in act, are the knowables and sensibles in act; whereas the power of the sensitive soul, and that which is able to know—namely, the intellective power—is not the sensible or knowable itself, but is in potency to them: the sensitive power to the sensible, and that which is able to know to the knowable. It remains, therefore, that the soul is in a way all things.
[lib. 3 l. 13 n. 3 · Marietti #788] Next, when he says Now it is necessary, he shows that the soul is all things in a manner different from what the ancients posited; and he says that if the soul is all things, it must be either the knowable and sensible things themselves—as Empedocles posited that by earth we know earth, by water water, and so with the rest—or else be their species. Now the soul is not the things themselves, as those thinkers posited, because a stone is not in the soul, but the species of the stone. And in this manner the intellect in act is said to be the very thing understood in act, inasmuch as the species of the thing understood is the species of the intellect in act.
[lib. 3 l. 13 n. 4 · Marietti #789] From this it is clear that the soul is likened to the hand. For the hand is the organ of organs, because hands have been given to man in place of all the organs that have been given to other animals for defense, or attack, or covering; for man prepares all these things for himself with the hand. And in a similar way the soul has been given to man in place of all forms, so that man may in a way be the whole of being, inasmuch as according to his soul he is in a way all things, insofar as his soul is receptive of all forms. For the intellect is a certain power receptive of all intelligible forms, and sense is a certain power receptive of all sensible forms.
[lib. 3 l. 13 n. 5 · Marietti #790] Next, when he says Now since, because he had stated that the intellect is in a way the intelligibles just as sense is the sensibles, someone might suppose that the intellect does not depend upon sense—and this would indeed be true if the intelligibles of our intellect were separated from sensibles according to being, as the Platonists posited. And therefore here he shows that the intellect needs sense, and afterward that the intellect differs from imagination, which likewise depends upon sense, at Now imagination is. He says, therefore, first, that because nothing understood by us exists apart from sensible magnitudes, as though separated from them according to being in the way sensible things appear separated from one another, it is necessary that the intelligibles of our intellect exist in sensible forms according to being—both those spoken of by abstraction, namely mathematical things, and natural things, which are the habits and attributes of sensibles. And on account of this, without sense no man can either learn, as acquiring science anew, or understand, as making use of science already possessed; rather, whenever anyone actually contemplates, he must simultaneously form for himself some \ phantasm, for phantasms are likenesses of sensibles.
[lib. 3 l. 13 n. 6 · Marietti #791] Yet they differ from them in this respect, that they exist apart from matter. For sense is receptive of species without matter, as was stated above, and imagination is a motion produced by sense according to act. Now from this it is clear that what \ Avicenna posits is false, namely, that the intellect has no need of sense once it has acquired science. For it is manifest that even after someone has acquired the habit of science, in order actually to contemplate he must make use of a phantasm; and on account of this, injury to a bodily organ impedes the use of science already acquired.
[lib. 3 l. 13 n. 7 · Marietti #792] Next, when he says Now imagination is, he shows the difference between imagination and the intellect: first, with respect to the common operation of the intellect, which is composition and division, saying that imagination is distinct from the affirmation or negation of the intellect, because in the combination of intelligibles there is already truth and falsehood, which is not in imagination; for knowing the true and the false belongs to the intellect alone.
[lib. 3 l. 13 n. 8 · Marietti #793] Second, at Now the primary, he inquires wherein the primary concepts—that is, the understandings of indivisibles—differ, seeing that they are not phantasms. And he replies that they are not without phantasms, and yet they are not phantasms: because phantasms are likenesses of particulars, whereas things understood are universals abstracted from individuating conditions; whence phantasms are indivisibles in potency, and not in act.